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Dialogue as Rhetoric of Deliberation in the  
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Petra Aczél 
Rhetoric: code, mode, discourse 
1 Definitions 
Classic rhetoric derives from the ancient Greek and Roman where it served as 
the universal science of the public sphere in which right acting and right 
speaking were considered one and there was no distinction drawn between 
thought and speech (Plato: Sophist). Although broadly defined as the art of 
persuasion it has always tended to outgrow its original concern with persuasive 
public speaking. Its genuine communicative and strategic characteristics, the 
philosophical concerns, the pragmatic and semiotic approaches, its references to 
both the public and the personal have made rhetoric an interdisciplinary field of 
interpersonal, organizational and public discourse. 
Kibédi Varga Áron, the Hungarian scholar emphasizes that rhetoric is the 
mediator between God and men, a device in man’s hand to submit the world into 
a Godly order and through this to come to know God. This knowledge gives man 
humanity; his/her organic function in the whole. Rhetoric is a code of cognition 
and knowledge. (Kibédi Varga 1998. 58). Lloyd Bitzer (1968) defines rhetoric 
as the mode of altering reality by the creation of discourse which changes reality 
through the mediation of thought and action, while Cheney et al (2004) conclude 
that rhetoric is “concerned about the way discourse is intertwined with human 
relations.” As a code to render the cognition of the world into an orderly state, a 
mode of altering reality by discourse and a discourse that is bound with and by 
human relations rhetoric is a system, a method, and a language that can be 
applied to situations of human interactions. 
2 Rhetoric as consciousness 
Philosophically speaking rhetoric is required whenever there is genuine 
communication. In Johnstone’s (2007) view rhetoric is the evocation and 
maintenance of the consciousness required for communication. Without 
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remaining conscious communication will become perfect (or absolute) and 
collapse into non-communication. Non-communication is where there is no 
intention or opportunity for the refusal of statements, that is it that lacks the 
space of dialogue. Rhetoric is concerned with the acceptance or refusal to accept 
statements. To be conscious of something is to always interrupt the unity of the 
transaction between subject and object. Consciousness confronts the person with 
something radically other than himself. Consciousness is the relevant distance 
and distinction between subject and object, between the person and what is 
communicated. Rhetoric needs to be differentiated from suggestion as 
suggestion aims at dissolving the interface (the distance) while rhetoric is 
driving a wedge between a person and data. 
Rhetoric, in this philosophical sense is inherently embedded in human 
existence and interaction. It cannot be considered to be just the art of persuasion 
but the inevitable technique to obtain the necessary consciousness to relate 
ourselves to objects (persons, situations or events) and to experience facts and 
values. 
The public sphere is the dimension of the social human activity where this 
consciousness guarantees the civilised social distance with which people enjoy 
the company of each other (Sennett), the rational distance from views that 
enables interactors to argue and the dialogic distance that promotes unity 
through the individual.  
3 Persuasion, rationality and dialogue 
Rhetoric is ‘the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion’ as Aristotle (1355b) put it. Since each science was expected to have 
its own extraverbal subject matter Aristotle did not consider rhetoric a science 
but an art. Debated as a science it was later defined as to be either a faculty or a 
virtue. Its verbal persuasive function (dicere ad persuadendum accommodate, 
Cicero) – based on ethos pathos and logos, applying argumentation as a social 
practice – has widely been accepted and it has long been referred to as agonistic. 
Persuasion as the symptom of “agon” (the liberation of all strength in world 
battles, the human condition of public presence and visibility) is most commonly 
referred to as practice of the coercive and manipulative power. Nevertheless, the 
rhetoric argumentation providing speech and social act with persuasive strength 
is based on forms of reasoning and public reasoning exploits logic that has its 
roots in social cooperation. Thus persuasive rhetoric argumentation in a 
theoretical sense is of dialogic nature.  
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3.1 Argumentation and thinking 
The same argument which we use in persuading others when we speak in public 
we also employ when we deliberate in our thoughts (Isocrates: Antidosis). 
Argumentation addressed to others is the process we employ when mediating in 
ourselves when mediating about matters. As psychologists explain people asked 
to think aloud present protocols that are not a sort of monologue, rather in a 
rhetorical context they attempt to justify and persuade themselves in front of the 
critical eye 
Durkheim (1912/1965) stated ways of individual thinking are formed by the 
group as the person is constantly dependent upon the knowledge gained formerly 
by society, he/she obtains it externally through socialization. 
Notions categories, abstract rules of thinking are not individual but 
collective representations, products of the social life. 
Durkheim grounded this statement with two arguments: 
• Substantial notions of thinking, logical rules and structuration exceed the 
level of individual activity and assume the cooperation of minds. (the 
notion of time and space exceed the individual perception and presumes 
the common context of individual perception. Logical rules provide the 
inevitable laws of exhanging thoughts, thus become necessary by social 
demands. They can be opposed to the anarchy of spontaneous 
representations of the individual. 
• Collective representations are sociomorphic and model the structure and 
system of the social group. 
 
According to the conclusion of Durkheim’s approach thinking is of social origin. 
When Durkheim rates the universal characteristics of creative thinking into the 
collective sphere, he implicitly alludes to cooperation, objectivity and mutuality  
Thinking is dialogic in terms of reasoning and is sociomorphic in terms of 
social cooperation and socialization. Dialogue as the immanent feature of 
thinking explicitly represents the social nature of argumentation. 
Thinking and argumentation, reasoning and dialogue are bound in the 
rhetoric context: the monologue of rhetoric speech possesses the content of a 
dialogue.  
3.2 Consensus and rationality 
As Habermas describes the ideal speech situation stipulates that there be a 
reciprocal relationship between all those participating in discourse. Consensus 
aimed at by the utmost rational communicative action can be reached only by the 
intersubjectivity and inclusiveness of the situation, with an orientation toward 
reaching understanding.  
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Rationality and logical operations used in rhetoric discourse are dependent 
upon social cooperation and understanding. As child psychology revealed 
(Piaget, 1945, Brown and Gribetz, 1995) logic is not an innate character of 
human beings but it develops as the result of mutual relations. 
Thinking, at the beginning (age 2-7) is a kind of mental experiment, the 
translation of possible activities into symbols or images. This is ideographic 
thinking, the highest form of which is intuitive thinking and accompanies the 
activities done in the sensorial motoric field 
At the age of 7 and 8 the mental activities of intuitive judgments lead to the 
stabilized equilibrium characterized by reversibility, it is the starting point of 
logical operations. These are born not separately but from the reorganization of 
the whole system. 
At the stage of real logical operations (after stages of self centeredness and 
selfishness, subjective perception based intuitive (monological) thinking, actual 
activity as central organizing principle) (between 7-11, 12) children are able to 
cooperate. They are capable of thinking not only from their own point of views 
but from other aspects as well and thus capable of matching different real or 
possible points of views. The young person is ready to engage in dialogues, in 
inner dialogue (minding – thinking) and is able to express thoughts in an 
structured, ordered way.  
There is a strong and substantial connection, bound between the 
development of logical operations and cooperation. The individual creates 
his/her own logic through cooperation with others not before it. Free cooperation 
creates that mutuality between perceptual judgments and representations which 
are essential for rational, objective operations. Modern sociological approach 
tends to presume that logic is forced on the individual by social relations. But 
only when these relations dispose of this logic: coercion does not necessarily 
have this kind of cooperative logic. 
Rhetoric that is generally considered agonistic represents the individual 
intention to win over the other. Formal agonistic oratory in which there are clear 
winners and losers aims at the deconstruction of the opponent and the dialogic 
sphere.  
Rhetoric exploiting social logic, the possibility of enthymemes (truncated 
syllogisms, pragmatic logical implicatures when one premise is missing in order 
to invite the listener to a common thinking and reasoning), the inner infinity of 
thinking is dialogic and rational in terms of mutuality and cooperation. It is the 
discourse of communities, it is the discourse of unity. 
In Burke’s unique ‘dramatism’ theory persuasion results from 
identification. This model holds that humans manage social situations through 
their use of language, through symbolic acts, because their management is the 
principal means by which they coordinate their social actions. Language no 
longer being the means for conveying information is regarded here as modes of 
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action. Burke emphasized the influence of symbols (rather than arguments) 
essential to evoke shared meaning and foster identification. Symbols as means of 
identification invite and implicate others in cooperative enterprises. “You can 
persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture and 
tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (Burke, 
1969: 55). This language is a “voice within” on which effective persuasion 
depends. Rhetoric through identification promotes social coherence and as such 
has a socializing role (Burke, 1969; Livesey, 2002). 
4 Dialogic rhetoric 
Dialogue involves justification of views and rebuttals (Kuhn, 1991, Tindale, 
2004), so it is also dependent upon the consciousness that gives distance to 
consider interaction and to have the freedom to refuse. Nevertheless, in 
Bakthin’s (1981) view dialogue is ruined by agonistic speech and persuasion. 
Anticipation of the answer and the word’s structuring in accordance with the 
anticipation of the future answer is what characterizes dialogue, not the fighting 
views and rebuttals.  
As Bakhtin (1981: 280) explains the internal dialogism of the word:  
The word in living conversation is directly blatantly oriented toward a 
future answer-word. It provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures 
itself in the answers directions. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the 
already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by which has 
not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the 
answering word. 
Dialogues have the dynamic dialectic structure of not pro-cons but words 
provoking answers. Aiming at consensus dialogue is a complex form of 
centripetal (consolidating) and centrifugal (dispersive) meaning functions and 
interactions.  
According to the summary of Gergen et al (2002), referring to recent 
theoretical approaches dialogue is considered to be the form of communication 
from which something new emerges, it is concerned with the creation of 
convergence in views, with conflict reduction, or with a logic of stating and 
questioning; a form of communication that questions all certainty of knowledge.  
Rhetoric is dialogic in terms of persuasion and argumentation. Dialogue is 
rhetoric because of contrasting different reasons and being of social nature, 
rooting back to commonly shared knowledge. Dialogue as the process of 
unconstrained public discourse is inevitable to understand an issue and thus is of 
political importance. 
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Dialogic rhetoric as a public practice is exploited in sense-making 
methodology of public campaigns (Dervin and Frenette, 2001), when campaign 
audiences are addressed and communicated communicatively. “Being dialogic is 
not simply a matter of packaging messages to match audience information 
processing styles or finding ways to transmit messages via trusted, credible or 
intimate others. It is a matter of acknowledging in the core of the campaign the 
everyday sense-makings of audiences. All communication is ultimately 
dialogic.” (Dervin and Frenette 2001: 85) Dialogue can also be utilized in 
creating commonly shared meanings, a sense of belongingness if corporations 
are in a stage of change and experience it as uncertainty. 
5 Community and deliberation 
Béla Hamvas (2006), the Hungarian philosopher when contrasting the mass with 
the community described the former as heterogeneous, material and united in 
place by accidence that degrades the individual existence and the latter as 
homogeneous, spiritually united, bound by a supernatural power that exaggerates 
individual life. 
Communities are not cooperative groups of individuals, as human etologists 
claim Community is a unique level of formation that is the characteristic of 
humans only. It is of course, based upon mutuality and cooperation but beside 
these features it is rooted in the sacrifice of the individual dimension (interest, 
desire, need), with the intent to understand, accept and reflect the other, in the 
phenomenon of solidarity /solidarity here is not meant as the acceptance of the 
individualism of the other – egalitarianism – but as an attitude oriented at 
accepting the unity of autonomous individuals). Therefore communities are not 
practical but human in a spiritual sense. This sphere of ‘belongingness’ is also 
the sphere of the dialogic word and the social logic of rhetoric argumentation.  
When we deliberate we imagine different futures and contrast different 
reasons for avoiding and wishing these futures. Deliberation is a strategic 
communicative action of political nature. The capacity for reasoned speech and 
the capacity to make arguments gives human beings their political character 
(Aristotle: Politics 1253a, Yack 2006). The notion of politicos refers to the ethos 
of the public man, it reflects the intention to think, consider and decide together 
and the capacity to argue, to resist neutrality and indifference. 
Deliberation is the practice of the ideal public man, the operation of the 
politicos. It is a social practice in which citizens communicate with each other 
about how they should direct the life of their communities. Strategically 
speaking it is a process in which problems and solutions are identified and 
applied by and within the community: an inherent activity of the non-
homogeneous but consciously united community.  
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(Political) deliberation prepares collective decisions by helping individuals 
to orient towards a common perspective and determine themselves which 
collective action to support. Deliberation is not collective decision making (or 
voting) it is the process of preparing decisions by providing arguments. 
Arguments are drawn from the merited opinion, from common knowledge, 
they are formed with the consciousness that recognizes and bridges the distance 
between individuals and perceived and considered as operations of communities. 
Public arguments are addressed to people in general and belong to the 
public sphere where citizens participate on equal grounds. Arguments here are to 
be understood not on the basis of expertise but on the accumulated “social 
knowledge” of citizens (Goodnight, 1982). 
Media based publicity in the twentieth
 
and twenty-first centuries, however, 
has privatized this social knowledge and represented it as the monopoly of 
experts or as the stock of field specific assumptions.  
Interaction is highlighted in new media turns out to be a discursive pattern 
of multivocality rather than dialogue. Without the social knowledge citizens are 
deprived of the assertiveness to engage in deliberation. Knowledge that is given 
and echoed is different from knowledge that is created and debated. 
Public communication strategies mostly use the content distribution 
technique: the readiness of content and the passivity of the receivers characterize 
the process by which citizens are becoming indifferent and uninterested in 
matters of their own communities. 
Especially in former socialist countries where discourses of memory, the 
coding of socio-historical events and processes, the narratives of suffering, the 
motives and notions to define the recent past do not yet exist this common 
sociocultural knowledge is painfully missing. Public communication and 
rhetoric is definitely monological and manipulative stimulated by perspectives 
and intellects of dominant groups. 
Without the civil sphere and the endeavor of citizens to gain this common 
knowledge deliberation can only be referred to as democratic voting. 
It is not the audience that initiates rhetoric, it is the rhetoric that initiate 
audience. Agonistic oratory creates supporters and enemies. Dialogic rhetoric 
creates communities with recognition of the shared knowledge (narratives, 
discourses, definitions), the context of creative uncertainty and the possibility of 
spiritual unity. 
6 Brief summary 
Rhetoric as public praxis has to be rehabilitated, improved and applied in a 
dialogic way to situations of deliberation: preparation of common (political) 
decisions. Rhetoric in its dialogical sense is dependent on a fourth appeal beside 
ethos, pathos and logos, and that is the spiritual. 
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Rhetoric offers the consciousness that provides the necessary distance for 
communication and dialogue. Rhetorical arguments are of a genuinely social 
nature and are the results of social cooperation. 
Dialogue as rhetoric creates a context of solidarity, participation, and 
responsibility. Rhetoric as dialogue reflects the common knowledge and the 
sense of togetherness. 
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